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Introduction
Middle-aged, white non-Hispanic men and women in the United States with a high school degree or less have experienced two adverse, secular trends. First, deteriorating labor market opportunities, associated with outsourcing and automation of tasks performed by medium-skilled workers and the polarization of wages (e.g. Autor and Acemoglu, 2011; Autor et al., 2013 Autor et al., , 2014 . Second, markedly increasing abuse of illicit drugs like opioids, associated with "[s]elf-reported declines in health, mental health, and ability to conduct activities of daily living, and increases in chronic pain and inability to work, as well as clinically measured deteriorations in liver function" (Case and Deaton, 2015) . Deaton (2015, 2017 ) hypothesize a strong relationship between rising consumption of intoxicants and the adverse labor market implications of automation and globalization. They argue that the relative deprivation of the middle class has resulted in stress-inducing social status losses and despair that is associated with higher incidence of mental illness like depression, bipolar disorder or anxiety disorder. 1 Mental illness, in turn, is known as a causal factor for illicit drug dependency and abuse disorder (Swendsen et al., 2010) . The Case-Deaton hypothesis is thus consistent with a large literature on "social causation", highlighting the role of perceived inequity and social comparisons on mental illness and drug abuse (e.g. Kessler, 1979 In light of this suggestive evidence it may seem surprising that, for the specific case of the U.S. opioid epidemic, Ruhm (2018) does not find robust evidence that the local economic environment is significantly related to the consumption of intoxicants. Instead he suggests that improved availability and falling prices of illicit drugs are largely responsible 1 Alarmingly, the consumption of antidepressants among middle-aged men and women in the U.S. has doubled between 1999-2012 (Kantor et al., 2015) .
for the epidemic. His findings, however, do not exclude an important role of a changing economic environment that has disproportionately a↵ected the U.S. middle class, since socio-economic deprivation may interact with falling opioid prices in determining illicit drug consumption.
These considerations are the starting point of our analysis. In order to capture the potential mechanisms we set up a model that allows us to examine the isolated and interaction e↵ects of reductions in demand for medium-skilled intensive tasks and changes in illicit drug prices on mental health problems, mental health expenditure, and consumption of intoxicants, conditional on the health system. We also examine the role of health care coverage and the extent of health insurance. In the U.S., low-skilled workers typically have access to Medicaid if privately uninsured, which is less typical for middle income earners who experienced socio-economic deprivation. Thus, particularly the uninsured middle class could be inclined to abuse opioids as a substitute for health expenditure. We therefore also investigate the skill-specific di↵erences in mental health status, mental health expenditure, consumption of intoxicants, and welfare between insured and uninsured workers.
The supply-side features a version of the task-based labor market model by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) . The model explains declining relative wages of medium-skilled workers that we view as indicative of socio-economic deprivation of the middle class. The main innovation of the paper is on the household side, where we formalize the notion of Deaton (2015, 2017) . As socio-economic deprivation causes stress, the incidence of mental illness becomes more likely for the middle class and the average severeness of mental illness may increase. We allow consumption of intoxicants to mitigate adverse utility e↵ects of mental illness as a substitute for health spending. The health system captures both private insurance and tax-financed health care for the poor and uninsured (Medicaid).
Our results suggests that the drug epidemic among the U.S. middle class requires the interaction between socio-economic deprivation and falling opioid prices. We demonstrate via counterfactual analysis that relative deprivation in isolation does not su ce, except in the case where it causes also greater severeness of mental illness among the mentally ill.
Hence, our theory reconciles the "despair hypothesis" of Deaton (2015, 2017) with the "price hypothesis" of Ruhm (2018) . Falling opiod prices alone cannot explain rising opioid consumption of the middle class. By contrast, falling opioid prices alone can explain the increasing opioid consumption among workers with low but over time increasing wages.
Moreover, our analysis points to a central role of the U.S. health care system for explaining the increased drug abuse. The model predicts that, when hit by mental illness, privately uninsured workers spend more on intoxicants and less on health than insured workers with the same skill level. We also show that middle class workers without private health insurance would benefit from public health care coverage in an environment where illicit drug prices are declining over time and that low-skilled workers would benefit from a more generous Medicaid system.
Our results are consistent with empirical evidence. Jones et al. (2015) show that past year heroine abuse is highly correlated with not having access to Medicaid or other health insurance and that it is also highly correlated with past year opioid pain reliever (and other psychotherapeutic) nonmedical use. and 2010 in the U.S. with France. In the age group 25-44, there was an increase by 42 and 106 percent for U.S. males and females, respectively, while decreasing by 17 and 35 percent in France. In the age group 45-64, deaths of despair increased by 59 and 96 percent for U.S. males and females, respectively, but decreased by 20 and 26 percent in France. The authors attribute such dramatically di↵erent experiences to a universal health care system in France that is very di↵erent to the one in the U.S. They conclude that the health system is important for the health e↵ects of rising earnings inequality.
Our analysis complements these empirical studies with counterfactual experiments that account for the substitutability between health spending and drug abuse at the individual level and with a quantitative analysis of U.S. health care reforms. The calibrated model deepens the understanding of underlying mechanisms that could be exploited in future empirical research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, which is algebraically analyzed in section 3. Section 4 calibrates the model. Section 5 quantifies important results from the equilibrium analysis for the status quo Medicaid system and performs counterfactual analysis to gauge the role of falling illicit drug prices and socioeconomic deprivation of the middle class for illicit drug consumption, mental health care expenditure, and welfare of the mentally ill. Section 6 examines how illicit drug consumption and mental health expenditure would change if Medicaid were extended. Section 7 discusses the results by assuming that socio-economic deprivation does not only a↵ect the probability of developing mental illness but also its average intensity for those becoming ill. The last section concludes.
The Model
We focus on middle-aged individuals living in non-overlapping generations. The model links endogenous wage polarization, mental health status, and consumption of intoxicants, conditional on the evolution of illicit drug prices and the mental health care system. Time is discrete and indexed by t.
Production Technology and Tasks
There is a homogenous final good with price normalized to unity. It is produced under perfect competition according to
2 (0, 1), where H Y is high-skilled labor input, A is a productivity parameter that measures the e ciency of high-skilled labor, and X is a composite intermediate input.
We occasionally omit the time index for notational simplicity provided there is no potential confusion from referring to di↵erent time periods.
For the composite input, we employ the task-based approach of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) . Its level of production depends symmetrically on input of a unit mass of tasks, indexed by j 2 [0, 1] with quantity x(j) of task j, according to the constant-returns to scale technology
Any task j may be produced by low-skilled and medium skilled labor, l(j) and m(j),
respectively, that are perfectly substitutable, 3 i.e.
with ↵ L (j) > 0 and ↵ M (j) > 0. We assume that, for all j and t,
is a continuously di↵erentiable and strictly increasing function. As argued in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), in this case there exists an endogenous threshold level J t 2 (0, 1) that separates the task space into those performed by low-skilled and those performed by medium-skilled workers according to their comparative advantage. That is, l(j) > 0 and m(j) = 0 for all j < J whereas l(j) = 0 for all j J.
The extent of outsourcing or automation of middle class jobs up to time t can be captured by the size of subset D t ⇢ [J t , 1) removed out of the set of tasks initially performed by medium-skilled workers, i.e. D 0 = ?. We denote by t ⌘ |D t | the measure of this set in t (i.e. 0 = 0). The set of tasks performed by medium-skilled workers thus reads as Z ⌘ [J, 1)\D and has measure |Z| = 1 J . The representative final good producer purchases any task j 2 D t at (exogenous) pricep t either from outside the economy ("outsourcing") or at the competitive price that equals the rate of transformation between the final good and the respective tasks ("automation").
Denote by w L t , w M t and w H t the wage rate per unit of low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled labor in period t, respectively. As will become apparent in Section 3, the equilibrium relative wage rates of medium-skilled workers compared to both other skill groups, w M /w L and w M /w H , are declining with ("wage polarization").
3 In contrast to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), high-skilled labor is only imperfectly substitutable to medium-and low-skilled labor, according to (1)-(3).
Individuals
Individuals live and work one period in non-overlapping generations. In each period a new cohort of size one is born. There are three sets of workers denoted by L, M and H with possibly time-varying sizes L ⌘ |L|, M ⌘ |M| and H ⌘ |H|, capturing the sets of workers with low, medium and high education, respectively. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor. Thus, population sizes equal the total supply of the respective type of labor. For simplicity, we abstract from educational choice. There are no frictions in the labor market.
We now formalize the notion of Deaton (2015, 2017 ) that socio-economic deprivation associated with automation and outsourcing leads to mental illness associated with despair and investigate under which circumstances it can explain the rising abuse of intoxicants. More precisely, the stress level associated with negative deviations (i.e. losses) from earnings aspirations causes mental illness, conditional on the education level.
The notion is supported by evidence showing that lower socio-economic status leads to a higher probability of mental illness (see Reiss, 2013, and Pickett and Wilkinson, 2015, for surveys). Swendsen et al. (2010) argue that, in turn, mental illness causes illicit drug abuse.
We assume that aspirations come from the previous period's earnings relative to social comparison groups. Low-skilled workers compare themselves with medium-skilled workers, medium-skilled workers compare themselves with both low-skilled and high-skilled workers, and high-skilled workers compare themselves with medium-skilled workers. As will become apparent, only medium-skilled workers lose relative to their social comparison group such that w t is given by
The first derivatives of function G are positive and G(0, 0) = 1. Hence, a decline of relative wage rates of medium skilled workers compared to the previous period increases the likelihood to become mentally ill. From (5), we obtain the skill group-specific fraction of mentally ill individuals as a function of the distribution of wages in the previous and current period.
The severity of mental illness an individual i su↵ers from is denoted by n(i). We allow for heterogeneity of the severity of mental illness such that, on average, mental illness may be more severe if the probability to become mentally ill is higher. This links the extensive and intensive margin of mental illness and illicit drug abuse. Formally, let f (n; ) denote the p.d.f. of n conditional on with support N ( ) ⇢ (0, 1) and assume that expected value of n,n( ) ⌘ R N ( ) nf (n; )dn, is non-decreasing in . Clinically, psychiastrists distinguish between mild and severe depression. In our context,n 0 ( ) > 0 captures that stress caused by socio-economic deprivation raises the relative frequency of severe depression. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that occupation status, job strain, and job insecurity are a strong predictors of mental well-being scores and severity of depression (Stansfeld et al., 1998; Power et al., 2002) .
The e↵ective mental health status of individual i is denoted by S(i). It depends negatively on the severity of mental illness an individual su↵ers from, n(i), and is nondecreasing in his/her consumption level of health goods and services targeted to treat mental illness, h(i), according to
where  > 0 measures the (time-invariant) e↵ectiveness of the health input and ✓ 2 (0, 1] measures the (possibly time-variant) extent of decreasing returns in the health technology.
The maximally e↵ective health input,h, achieves full recovery.
In addition to consuming a standard numeraire good, individuals may abuse intoxicants like opioids (e.g. heroine, fentanyl, tramadol). One unit of such drug can be bought at exogenous and possibly time-variant (world market) price q t in period t. Let c(i) and d(i) denote consumption levels of the numeraire good and illicit drugs of individual i, respectively. Welfare of individual i in period t is represented by the utility function
where 0 <  1, 0 < < 1, andū is an arbitrary constant. Property u cS > 0 captures that a decline in health status S reduces the marginal utility of consumption, in line with evidence by Finkelstein et al. (2013) . The innovation of modeling preferences as in (7) lies in the potential motivation of mentally ill persons to consume intoxicants. Illicit drug consumption is not beneficial when the numerator of function u is positive, i.e. u d < 0.
In this case, individuals would choose d = 0. Ifū > 0, however, utility turns negative if health status, S, and the numeraire good consumption level, c, are su ciently low such that S · c <ū. In this case, u d > 0 and an individual may demand intoxicant drugs to dampen the pain or negative feelings associated with poor mental health and/or low consumption. 5 Properties u cd < 0 and u dS < 0 mean that higher consumption c or better health status S reduce the benefit from consuming intoxicants, respectively.
Ill individuals face two interesting trade-o↵s. First, they could reduce numeraire good consumption (c) to raise health good consumption (h) and thus improve mental health status (S). However, this may not help to prevent negative utility if an individual is poor to begin with and/or is severely a↵ected by mental illness (i.e. has a high n). In this case, second, a mentally ill individual faces the trade-o↵ to raise h or to consume intoxicants (d) for mitigating negative utility. The health system potentially a↵ects both trade-o↵s and is introduced next.
Health System
We focus on the part of the health insurance system that pays to a certain degree for the costs to treat mental illness. In the U.S., private health insurance is typically provided by employers. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that most workers do not choose or understand their health care plan with respect to coverage of costs of mental illness (e.g. Garnick, 1993; Meredith, 2001 ). Thus, we assume that mental health care plans are exogenous.
A fraction µ L , µ M , µ H of the low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled workforce has no private health insurance, respectively, µ
The uninsured low-skilled labor force receives a subsidy rate s 2 (0, 1) for mental health costs, which in the U.S. may be thought of as Medicaid. Privately insured workers have a common health care subsidy rate,s > s, i.e. 1 s is the copayment rate. Privately uninsured medium-and high-income earners are not eligible for Medicaid, thus having a copayment rate of 100 percent.
The simple health system in our model captures in a stylized way the U.S. health system, in which private health insurance coexists with tax-financed Medicaid on behalf of poor, uninsured individuals. To simplify and focus on isolated e↵ects, we neglect that some uninsured, non-poor are eligible for Medicaid and some uninsured poor are not.
Also for simplicity, all insured workers have the same proportional health care contribution rate,⌧ 2 (0, 1), i.e. absolute premia levels are rising with income to capture that higher income workers generally have more generous health care plans if insured. Health care plans typically come in a package that includes treatment for mental illness that we assume, however, not to be di↵erent across individuals. Privately insured health costs are financed in a pay-as-you-go fashion (i.e. the health care subsidy budget is balanced each period). For Medicaid, there is a separate budget. It is financed by general income taxes levied at rate ⌧ on medium and high-skilled workers, 6 whereas the low-skilled do not pay taxes for financing Medicaid. This captures a progressive tax system. 6 The expenditure share of Medicaid in total government spending from all sources was 28.2 percent in 2012, see https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets/.
The gross price of the health good in period t, r t , is exogenously given by the world market and possibly time-variant. Because di↵erent types of individuals face di↵erent subsidy rates in the health system, the e↵ective health good prices di↵er according to income class and insurance status.
Equilibrium Analysis
In order to isolate mechanisms, we start by taking contribution rates and copayment rates for private and public health care as given before introducing the finance constraints of the health system in the numerical analysis.
Households' Decisions
Denote by y(i) the disposable income of individual i (net wage income after income-specific contributions to the health system) and by R(i) the individual-specific health good price (copayment). With price q of intoxicants, the budget constraint of individual i in t reads as
We will focus on interior solutions for the health input. According to (6) , (7) and (8), neglecting constraint 0  h h, and assuming that (8) holds with equality, we can define the objective function of an individual with disposable income y, severity of mental illness n, and health good price R as
according to (7) . The optimization problem of such an individual thus reads as
The optimal choices of health input, h, and illicit drug consumption, d, are denoted by h (i) An increase in disposable income ( y) raises health spending, h ⇤ , and, for = 1,
(ii) An increase in the severity of mental illness ( n) raises d ⇤ ;
(iii) An increase in both the price of intoxicants ( q) and in the e↵ectiveness of health
(iv) If = 1, then an increase in the net health good price (R) lowers h ⇤ while raising
Proof. See Appendix A.
Again, because health status is a normal good, health good consumption, h ⇤ , is in- 
Firms' Decisions
Denote by P t the price of the composite input and p t (j) the price of task j in t. The representative firm in the final good sector solves profit maximization problem
Using equilibrium condition H Y = H, associated first-order conditions imply
Using the production function of the composite input (2), the representative firm producing X solves profit maximization problem
First-order conditions are given by p(j) = P X/x(j), j 2 [0, 1]. Thus, we have
where the latter follows from (2). Wage rates are given by the value of their marginal products. According to task production function (3),
and again making use of (3) yields
Substituting (16) in (18) implies that l(j) = l(j 0 ) > 0 for any j, j 0 < J. Also using l(j) = 0 for any j J, labor market clearing condition
( 1 9 ) Similarly, for the medium-skilled, m(j) = m(j 0 ) > 0 for any j, j 
Combing first-order conditions p(j)x(j) = P X for all j with (3) also implies
Using (16), (17), (19), (20) and (21), we find
At the threshold level J t , the unit costs of producing with low-skilled and mediumskilled labor must be the same, i.e. equilibrium condition
must hold. Combining (22) and (23) and assuming an interior solution, J t is then implicitly given by 1
Proposition 3. Equilibrium threshold value J t (that separates tasks performed by low-skilled and medium-skilled workers) is decreasing in both the loss of tasks of middle class workers, t , and relative supply of medium to low skills, M t /L t . We have @J t /@ t 2
( 1, 0).
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem to (24) and recall that ↵
Proposition 3 shows that outsourcing forces medium-skilled workers to perform tasks formerly executed by low-skilled workers. If increases, then both groups are left with a lower task range. The e↵ects on relative wage rates of the two groups are to the disadvantage of medium-skilled workers whose jobs have been outsourced, as shown next (with superscript (*) denoting equilibrium levels).
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the relative wage rate of medium-to low-skilled workers is given by w We turn next to the relative wage rate of medium-to high-skilled workers.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium (log) relative wage rate of medium-to high-skilled workers is given by
is decreasing in t , L t /M t and M t /H t , and independent of A t .
Proposition 5 shows that outsourcing or automation worsens the earnings position of medium-skilled workers also relative to high-skilled workers, causing wage polarization.
Moreover, according to (25) and (26), the relative wage rate of medium-skilled labor to both other skill groups does not depend on the e ciency parameter of high-skilled labor,
A. This is in stark contrast to Acemoglu and Autor (2011) , who assumed that high-skilled labor can be perfectly substituted by labor with lower skill. High-skilled labor saving technological progress thus does not a↵ect the probability of medium-skilled workers to become mentally ill, according to (5) and Proposition 4 and 5.
Outsourcing, Mental Health, and Illicit Drug Consumption
Putting things together, we arrive at the following result. 
Calibration
We calibrate the model to examine both levels and changes over time of mental health care expenditure, drug consumption, and welfare of the di↵erent subgroups, taking into account the health care budget constraints. 7 The calibration of the production side, particularly the extent of outsourcing, , matches the changes in the earnings distribution over time, whereas an increase in productivity parameter A captures unbiased wage growth (Proposition 4 and 5). The household side and health instruments are calibrated to match, inter alia, the expenditure share on mental illness by taking into account that the price of intoxicants, q, has markedly fallen in the last decades. We then perform counterfactual analysis, assuming that q has remained constant over time and that socio-economic deprivation has not taken place. We finally investigate the implications of extending Medicaid.
Supply Side
We specify ↵ M (j) = 1 and ↵ L (j) = B/j to be time-invariant, j 2 [0, 1], where B > 0 is a productivity parameter. We consider the time period 1979 (roughly the starting date of steady increases in the college-premium) to 2007 (the onset of the financial crisis). The length between t and t + 1 is roughly 10 calendar years.
We use data from BLS (2017) on the educational attainment of the civilian workforce to determine relative group sizes. We associate low-skilled workers with those having less education than a high school degree, medium-skilled workers as either high school graduates or workers with some college (without degree), and high-skilled workers as those with a bachelor degree or more. . We estimate a constant trend growth rate of A t such that we match the growth rate of high-skilled wages w H t . Finally, we estimate the evolution of the extent of outsourcing, t , such that we match the empirical w 
Household Side and Health Instruments
For the calibration of household income, we feed in the wages of the three di↵erent classes from the production side. Since 1979 is our first year with wage data, we look at outcomes 2007 (with wage comparison to year 1999). We also start by assuming that all mentally ill individuals face the same severity of mental illness irrespective of their skill-specific probability to become ill an assumption that is relaxed later on. We set n(i) = 0.5 for all i as an intermediate value for the benchmark run. We also set = 0.7 (determining the marginal utility of numeraire consumption) and the utility constant toū = 14. These values imply that, at any year, utility is positive for non-depressed individuals and that utility turns negative for depressed low-and middle-income individuals if they receive no anti-depression therapy (i.e. for h = 0). This means that we set up a scenario of "despair", as motivated by Deaton (2015, 2017) , in which depression among the middle class is partly caused by lost social status. In this setup, the rich consume no drugs, capturing the notion that there is no despair motive that drives their drug consumption. 
> 0, 0 < < 1. We assume that the middle class is mainly socially upward oriented, = 0.1, and calibrate = 15 to induce an equal fraction (8. 
Mental Health Status and Health Expenditure
According to the upper left panel of Figure 2 , the fraction of mentally ill middle income earners is somewhat higher in the later year. This is the response to status loss under falling relative wages over time (Figure 1 ), as formalized in (5). All other panels show outcomes for workers having developed mental illness. We see an income gradient in mental health expenditure (including subsidies) for the privately insured (subscript I) in absolute terms (upper right panel) and as a fraction of gross income (middle right panel).
For the privately uninsured (subscript U ), health expenditure of the mentally ill is Ushaped in income due to the public subsidy (Medicaid) on health expenditure. Strikingly, insurance status creates large di↵erences in the health expenditure shares. Particularly the uninsured middle class spends comparatively little on mental health treatment. From Figure 2 , we see the income gradient for the insured and the U-shape for the uninsured also in terms of ex post (i.e. after treatment) mental health (middle left panel).
Like the U-shape with respect to health expenditure, the latter is of course to some degree imposed by the assumption that no middle income earner is eligible for Medicaid whereas in the data there are some beneficiaries (see KFF 2013). We see also that for insured middle income earners, ex post mental health (middle left panel) improves over time although ex ante mental health (upper left panel) deteriorates. By contrast, ex post mental health status of uninsured middle income earners, declines mildly over time. The reason is that socio-economic deprivation induces a substitution away from health spending towards drug consumption and this substitution is stronger for the uninsured. Notably, the outcome is special to the middle class. For the poor and rich, mental health improves irrespective of insurances status and the improvement is more pronounced for the insured. Table 1 reports the percentage changes of mental health expenditure over time of Upper part: the first index identifies the class (L low income, M middle, H high); the second index identifies the insurance status (I insured, U uninsured). All changes in percent relative to 1987 levels. Middle part: relative health care and drug consumption of uninsured vs. insured individuals by skill group and year. All changes in percent. Lower part: welfare and welfare changes in consumption equivalents. ⇠ i,j is the factor by which consumption of a depressed individual of group i, j need to increase to obtain the utility of a healthy individual of the same group, both evaluated in the base year (1989). ⇠ i,j is the change of the consumption equivalent from 1987 to 2007. di↵erent types and the skill-specific health expenditure levels of uninsured relative to insured individuals in each group. Column (1) of Table 1 The poor and the rich have higher expenditure increases (43-48 percent) than the middle class thanks to their higher wage growth.
Drug Consumption
The model predicts an income gradient in illicit drug consumption. Per mentally ill person, the poor spend more on drugs in both years (lower left panel of Figure 2 ). in Table 1 . The privately uninsured poor come second with an increase by 82 percent (and 79 percent for the insured). These results correspond well this with the actual increase of 62 percent for the poor and 77 percent for middle income earners (CDC, 2015) . However, we should not stress the comparison too much since the CDC reports prevalence while our model, strictly speaking, produces mostly increases in the intensity of drug use.
Because of income growth, the drug expenditure share for the poor and the middle class is somewhat decreasing over time but remains substantial also for the later year (lower right panel of Figure 2 ). A particularly interesting outcome is that uninsured middle income workers spend significantly more than the insured and their relative spending d
is higher for the later year. According to column (1) in Table 1 , in the year 2007 an uninsured middle income earner spends 49 percent more on drugs than an insured one (34.5 percent in 1989). The drug expenditure share is higher for the poor but, in contrast to the middle class, there is little di↵erence between the insured and uninsured (d L,U is just 6 percent higher than d L,I in both years). Again, this reflects that the uninsured poor are eligible for Medicaid, whereas the lack of health insurance may be an important cause of drug consumption for mentally ill middle class workers.
Welfare
In the lower part of Table 1 for all non-rich groups, the welfare distance between mentally ill and healthy individuals got larger over time, with a larger increase for uninsured individuals. 
Constant Drug Price
In a second case we investigate the impact of the price reduction of drugs by switching to the constant drug price scenario (q = 1 instead of q declining over time). Results are reported in column (2) of Table 1 .
The main di↵erence of case 2 to the benchmark case 1 lies in the type-specific consumption of intoxicants for both comparison years, visualized in the panel on the right-hand side of Figure 3 . We see that the increase in drug consumption at the intensive margin in the benchmark case for the period 1989-2007 was entirely motivated by the price decline.
Comparing Figure 2 and 3 suggests that, if drug prices stayed constant, drug consumption at the intensive margin would have declined for poor and middle class individuals.
After-treatment mental health status of uninsured middle class people, however, is still Table 1 ).
From columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 we also see that the increase over time of the welfare distance to healthy individuals (in terms of consumption equivalent) is smaller for the poor than in the benchmark case and actually reverses slightly for the middle class.
This means that welfare of mentally ill middle class individuals would have improved mildly over time, compared to their healthy group counterparts, if drug prices stayed constant.
No Socio-Economic Deprivation
We next counterfactually abolish socio-economic deprivation by assuming that wages of low-and medium-skilled workers grow at the same rate as high-skilled wages. In case 3,
we assume in addition that drug prices are declining, like in case 1. Results are shown in column (3) of Table 1 . Interestingly, we see that despite falling drug prices the middle class lowers drug consumption over time to zero. Income of the middle class is now increasing su ciently fast that medical treatment becomes the exclusive way of dealing with mental illness even for the uninsured. As a result, the welfare wedge between healthy and unhealthy middle class individuals declines substantially over time.
With constant drug prices (case 4), according to column (4) of Table 1 , like in case 2, also the low-skilled reduce their drug consumption over time albeit, in contrast to the middle class, not fully. The welfare di↵erence to the healthy counterparts basically remains unchanged.
Comparing the results to benchmark case 1, cases 3 and 4 suggest that both falling drug prices and economic deprivation are necessary to elicit increasing drug consumption of the middle class. It is thus the interaction between both forces that matter, reconciling the "despair hypothesis" with the evidence from Ruhm (2018) that relative deprivation alone cannot explain rising drug consumption.
Aggregate Drug Consumption
We next look at the evolution of aggregate drug consumption in cases 1-3, for the di↵erent skill groups and the total population. In order to compare with more recent data we also extrapolate trends for another period, i. where it reaches a level that is three times higher than the 1989 value. The increase is steepest for the middle class (albeit starting from a lower level compared to the low-skilled, according to Figure 2 ).
In the middle panel we see aggregate drug expenditures when the drug price stays constant (case 2). We see that drug consumption of the poor falls during the observation period and is predicted to fall further. The steep fall until 2007 also reflects the decline in the supply of low-skilled labor. The group of medium-skilled stayed roughly constant and the combination of falling relative but rising absolute wage rates generates a nonmonotonic time paths of drug consumption, with the 2017 level being at 83 percent of the 1989 level. Total drug consumption falls to about three quarters of the initial level.
The panel on the right-hand side of Figure 4 shows the counterfactual result if there is no socio-economic deprivation ("constant status") but the drug price is decreasing (case 3). Then, aggregate drug consumption increases for the poor despite falling group size and is predicted to rise further after 2007. For the middle class, illicit drug consumption falls to virtually zero. As a result, aggregate drug consumption in the total population is falling until 1999 and then only mildly rising to about three quarters of the 1989 value.
We can thus conclude, again, that explaining the sharp increase of aggregate drug consumption as observed in the U.S., requires both falling drug prices and relative deprivation of the middle class.
Numerical Results 2: E↵ects of Medicaid Reform
The key feature of our analysis is that illicit drug consumption is a potential substitute for mental health care for those hit by mental illness. Consequently, in particular the uninsured consume more drugs over time under the conditions highlighted in the previous section. This points to a potentially important role of the Medicaid system to which we turn now. The first index identifies the class (L low income, M middle, H high); the second index identifies the insurance status (I insured, U uninsured). All numbers in absolute values for the year 2007; ⇠ i,j is the factor by which consumption of a depressed individual of group i, j need to increase to obtain the utility of a healthy individual of the same group, both evaluated in the year 2007. The extended Medicaid system is denoted by ext MDCD and the more generous Medicaid system is denoted by gen MDCD; see text for details.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows for the year 2007 the health expenditure and drug use choices of the mentally ill for the benchmark, also displayed in Figure 2 (upper right panel and lower left panel, respectively). Column (2) of Table 2 displays the behavior and relative welfare of mentally ill workers when public health care (Medicaid) is extended to the privately uninsured middle class at the same subsidy rate as the poor, s = 0.6 (scenario "ext MDCD"). All else is kept the same as in the benchmark, except the tax rates that we adjust accordingly. We see that this reform would increase mental health expenditure, as intended. Importantly, drug consumption of the targeted middle class workers decreases by about one fifth (100 The bottom of Table 2 also displays welfare comparisons to the healthy group counterparts for 2007. Again comparing column (2) with column (1), we see that the reform also reduces the welfare di↵erence of mentally ill, uninsured middle class workers to their healthy counterparts. The poor are not a↵ected, as they do not pay for Medicaid.
Column (3) of Table 2 reports results of a generous Medicaid system ("gen MDCD") that raises the health care subsidy rate from 60 to 75 percent for both the privately uninsured middle class and the poor. As expected, mentally ill low-and middle income workers now spend more on mental health care and less on drugs. They also achieve higher welfare relative to healthy persons.
Overall, the results point to unambiguously positive e↵ects of health care subsidies on health spending and negative e↵ects on drug consumption. As the insured are only marginally a↵ected by Medicaid reforms (via tax rate adjustments only), the di↵erence between privately insured and uninsured types within income groups declines in a pronounced way.
Discussion: Intensity of Mental Illness
In the numerical analysis so far, we assumed that the average severity of mental illness, n(i), is unrelated to the probability to become ill, (i). Here we relax this assumption. Part (iii) of Corollary 1 suggests that socio-economic deprivation of middle class workers that is associated with a higher probability to become mentally ill could then raise drug consumption over time also at the intensive margin even for given drug price q. To illustrate this point, we now assume that n(i) =n( (i)) withn 0 ( ) > 0.
To allow for skill-specific severity of mental illness, let us specifyn( ) = 10 , i.e. Table 1 shows that for a declining drug price over time, mentally ill middle class workers now increase drug consumption more drastically (case 5), compared to the benchmark case 1. As expected, according to column (6) of Table 1 , drug consumption now increases over time also for constant prices (case 6) although to a lesser degree.
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The percentage increases are of similar magnitude for insured and uninsured workers. As we saw for the falling drug price scenario in Figure 2 , however, the uninsured have higher levels to start with. For the low-skilled, the changes in drug consumption over time in cases 5 and 6 are similar in magnitude to cases 1 and 2, respectively.
Due to the recalibration of preference parameter in cases 5 and 6 compared to cases 1-4, welfare di↵erences between mentally ill and healthy individuals are now higher. Changes in drug consumption over time lead to the welfare changes displayed at the bottom of Table   1 . According to columns (5) and (6), the consumption equivalent that would compensate middle class workers for mental illness almost doubles over time for the uninsured under falling drug prices (case 5) and substantially increases even for constant drug prices (case 6). It significantly rises also for the insured. By contrast, mentally ill low-skilled workers experience a relatively small welfare decline relative to the healthy when drug prices decline and, as for case 2, they experience a welfare improvement when drug prices stay constant.
We finally present the results of reforming Medicare for the "variable n" scenario.
Column (4) of Table 2 displays the choices and welfare levels for the year 2007 in case 5 (falling drug prices). Extending Medicaid to the uninsured middle class induces the targeted group to substitute away from drugs towards health spending, associated with higher welfare relative to the healthy group counterpart (column (5) of Table 2 ). Further substitution is induced by making Medicare more generous (column (6) of Table 2 ), not only for the middle class but also for the privately uninsured poor.
In sum, with skill-specific severity of mental illness, falling drug prices are not anymore required to explain rising drug consumption of the middle class, relative deprivation is su cient. All other conclusions remain qualitatively the same as in sections 5 and 6.
Conclusion
We have examined the hypothesis of Deaton (2015, 2017 ) that increased consumption of intoxicants of the middle class is rooted in labor market developments. We have proposed a framework in which (i) conditional on their income, mentally ill workers may consume intoxicants to mitigate negative utility as a substitute for mental health care and (ii) outsourcing or automation causes socio-economic deprivation of the middle class that results in higher incidence and possibly an increased severity of mental illness in that group.
Most importantly, our analysis suggests that in absence of an increased average severity of mental illness, a higher incidence caused by relative deprivation can explain the drug epidemic in the U.S. middle class only in interaction with falling drug prices. We thus reconcile the evidence by Ruhm (2018) who does not find that changes in the economic environment caused increasing drug consumption, in contrast to a changing drug environment. In fact, we find that both conditions have to be met as regards the middle class. However, the U.S. drug epidemic is also visible among low-skilled workers who have experienced in the last few decades rising earnings both in absolute terms and relative to the middle class. Our analysis suggests that for this group increased drug consumption can be entirely led back to falling opioid prices. If opioid prices stayed constant, their welfare would have improved relative to their healthy counterparts, whereas our model suggests that their relative welfare decreases when drug prices decline over time.
We also demonstrated that, theoretically, the Case-Deaton hypothesis alone would su ce to explain the U.S. drug epidemic in the middle class if the average severity of mental illness has risen among the mentally ill. Whether or not this is so is an empirical question.
A main (and novel) feature of our framework is the simultaneous choice and substitutability between illicit drug consumption and mental health expenditure, with important implications for public health care like tax-financed Medicaid in the U.S. We have argued that the lack of Medicaid access of the socio-economically deprived and uninsured middle class contributes to their high consumption of intoxicants. The lack of insurance is also responsible for large welfare gap between the mentally ill and the healthy. In addition, Also mentally ill workers with low skills and access to Medicaid would decrease drug consumption and would experience higher welfare under a more generous public health care system. These results strongly suggests that tax-financed public health care should be (and should have been) extended for mentally ill non-rich persons in order to fight the U.S. drug epidemic. The analysis also contributes to understanding why European coun-tries with a more generous public health care system avoided the same dismal experience, as documented by Haan, Hammerschmid and Schmieder (2018) for Germany.
Our analysis is a first attempt to investigate under which circumstances the consumption of intoxicants is related to despair of the U.S. middle class, by investigating a wider range of contributing factors. We provided a rationale for the observation that some individuals address mental illness in a seemingly unconstructive way, i.e. to dampen their negative feelings from poor health and declining status by abusing drugs. As a caveat, the presented one period non-overlapping generations framework does not capture the consequences of drug abuse. Future research may extend the framework featuring a lifecycle perspective of decisions and possibly boundedly rational behavior. Such a framework could take into account that drug addiction triggers further health problems and reduces productivity, features that are surely important but beyond the scope of our analysis.
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: According to (9), we havẽ (28) . Also according to (28) 
Comparative-static results in part (ii) follow by applying the implicit function theorem to (32) .
Finally, to show that d ⇤ = 0 when y is su ciently high even whenū > 0, define
according to (29) , and note that d ⇤ = 0 if g(y) < 0. Part (ii) is proven by showing that partial derivative g 0 (y) < 0. According to (32) , (34) 
Also define S
Moreover, using the envelope theorem which implies that (43) holds, we also obtain from
by recalling that  1 and < 1. Furthermore, (29) implies
Inserting (43) into (45), we find
Thus,ũ dy (h
Moreover, according to (29) ,
Inserting (43) into (50), we obtaiñ
Thus,ũ dR (h
According to (36) , (44) and (37) , this implies
Applying Cramer's rule, we have
where we used (38) , (37), (44) and (45) for the latter equation. Similarly, according to (40), (37) , (44) and (48), we have
According to (41), (37) , (44) and (49), we also obtain
Similarly, with (42), (37) , (44) 
Next, using (36), (37) , (38) and ( 
According to (36) , (37) , (39) and (47), we have
which is positive. We also find from (36), (37) , (40) and (48) that
which is negative, according to concavity condition (52).
Similarly, using (36), (37) , (41) 
Finally, from (36), (37) , (42) and (50) For the tasks produced outside the economy, output reads as x t (j) = P t X t p t for any j 2 D t .
Substituting (19) , (20) and (63) into (62), the (log of the) composite input is given by
Substituting P t = (1 ) (A t H/X t ) from (13) 
Next, use (16), (17) and p(j) =p t for any j 2 D t in (15) to obtain
Using the definition of log Q in (66) and inserting (13) 
Subtracting the right-hand side of (71) from the right-hand side of (70) implies
According to (24) , we have
Using (73), we then find
Also note from (24) that log ! t (J t ) log
Substituting (74) into (72) and using (75) confirms (26) . For the comparative-static result regarding a change in t , use the result @J t /@ t 2 ( 1, 0) from Proposition 3. The e↵ect of an increase in M t /H t follows from (26) by noticing from (25) that J t can be written as function of L t /M t and is independent of M t /H t . This concludes the proof. ⌅
B. Health Care Budget Constraints
Under the health system introduced in section 2, disposable income of an individual i 
We denote the (world market) price per unit of health input by r. In the baseline case where only the uninsured poor receive Medicaid, the individual price of the health input
(1 s t )r t if insured,
(1 s t )r t for i 2 L t if not insured, r t for i 2 {M t , H t } if not insured.
(77)
Let h ⇤ (y, R, ·) be the optimal health expenditure given disposable income, y, and the net price of the health good, R. We focus on the case where all ill individuals have the same extent of mental illness.
According to (76) and (77), the balanced budget condition for tax-financed Medicaid equates revenue and expenditure according to
Under conditions (4), according to (5), (76) and (77), the budget constraint for contributionfinanced health insurance that equates subsidies of health expenditures and health care contributions read as
